Abstract-Social network connectivity data that is anonymized and publicized for academic or commercial purposes are often vulnerable to de-anonymization attacks from attackers utilizing side information in the form of a second, public or crawled social network. Correlation between the two networks is the key factor allowing this attack scheme to work successfully. In this work, the best attack strategy available to de-anonymization attacker, namely the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate of the user identities, is identified for networks with community structure and sufficient conditions for perfect de-anonymization are obtained.
I. OVERVIEW Social network connectivity data are often publicized (and sometimes accidentally leaked) for research or commercial purposes to third parties. To keep the anonymity of individuals in the network intact, names and other personally identifying information are eliminated before the publication of the data. However an attacker might be able to recover some or all of the user identities using data from a second social network whose graph of user connectivity is publicly available or crawled by the attacker. This was previously demonstrated on real-world networks such as Twitter and Flickr [1] . Also in a recent attack, anonymized Netflix data of user viewing preferences was deanonymized using a publicly available IMDB database [2] .
De-anonymization of social networks relies on the correlation between the connectivity of the network under attack and that of the second network available to the attacker. We model the connectivities (graphs), g 1 and g 2 , of the correlated networks as samples of an underlying graph g, that represents the true relationships between the individuals in the network. Recently social network de-anonymization problem is theoretically analyzed under the assumption that underlying graph, g, is an Erdős-Rényi type of graph [3] .
We extend the Erdős-Rényi model to random graphs with community structure, known as stochastic block model, that has been empirically shown to represent social interaction maps better and recently been of interest in community detection literature. We focus on an attack setting in which the attacker aims to determine user identities only, assuming that the community labels in g 1 and g 2 are known.
In this paper, we first derive the maximum a posteriori (MAP) matching of nodes in the anonymized graph to the public graph assuming an underlying graph g with community structure. Note MAP matching is the best estimate of the deanonymizing attacker given the two graphs to minimize the probability of error. Second, we derive sufficient conditions on the statistical parameters of the model we are using that guarantee perfect de-anonymization of all users.
II. MODEL AND ANALYSIS
In our system model, we let g = (V, E g ) be an undirected graph of true relationships between n users. The number of users is |V | = n, and the edge set is E g ⊆ V × V . We assume nodes of g are partitioned into disjoint subsets of
An example of g for the two community case is shown in Figure 1 . Edges in E g are drawn independently at random as follows: nodes u ∈ C i and v ∈ C j are connected with probability p ij . From underlying graph of true relationships between users, g, we obtain two independent samples g 1 = (V, E g1 ) and g 2 = (V, E g2 ). We assume that only edges are sampled and not nodes, where
for i = 1, 2 and each edge is sampled independently. A matching of g 2 's nodes to g 1 's nodes, which is also a permutation over [n], is denoted as π : V → V , where Π is the set of all possible permutations that is compatible with the community assignments. For an edge e ∈ E g2 , we
We also define the MAP estimate of π given g 1 and g 2 as:
The proof is omitted because of space considerations and can be found in [4] .
Corollary 1.1. If g is an Erdős-Rényi graph with edge probability
Remark 1. The cost function in (1) is the same as the "edge mismatch" cost function that earlier works minimize, but without proof of optimality which we establish by Corollary 1.1. Following theorem presents sufficient conditions for the MAP estimate of π to be asymptotically almost surely equivalent to the correct matching, π 0 , for the two community case. For notational simplicity let p = p 11 = p 22 and q = p 12 .
Theorem 2. Given g 1 , g 2 and p, q → 0 where q ≤ p, and
then the probability of error of a MAP attacker goes to zero asymptotically, i.e., arg min
The proof is omitted because of space considerations and can be found in [4] . Corollary 2.1. In the case of single community (regular Erdős-Rényi graph with n 1 nodes), a sufficient condition for de-anonymization is
Remark 2. For the case of symmetric communities, n 1 = n 2 and non-zero inter-community edge probability q, conditions given in Theorem 2 are less strict than the result in Corollary 2.1 suggesting that inter-community edges help in the de-anonymization of nodes within a community. Remark 3. Concurrent work on de-anonymizing a regular (single-community) Erdős-Rényi graph [5] proposes a proof based on combinatorial methods and obtains a sufficient condition for successful de-anonymization that is stronger than Corollary 2.1 for the single community case. However our result in Theorem 2 is more general since it handles graphs with community structure. Remark 4. Setting s = 1 in Corollary 2.1 provides the following sufficient condition for successful de-anonymization:
Note for this special case, a necessary and sufficient condition for successful de-anonymization is the graph g not having any automorphisms (other than itself). The condition for this, found in [6] , is tighter than (2) by a factor of 3, showing that there is room for improvement in the calculation of probability of error.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we have investigated the de-anonymization problem in social networks for graphs with community structure. We have characterized the optimal attack strategy for this setting by determining the MAP estimate of the matching π, and determined sufficient conditions for successful deanonymization, asymptotically, for large graphs. For the special case of a single community, our results have proved the optimality of the de-anonymization strategy adopted in prior work.
Our work can be extended in various ways. An obvious extension is the case where communities are not assumed to be known in either g 2 or both g 1 and g 2 by the attacker. This context could potentially allow us to merge the deanonymization efforts we have been making with community detection results in the literature. This direction also leads us to define and formulate new problems in community detection context such as "community detection with side information" if we think of the first graph as a side information in detecting the communities in g 2 .
